Security controls and
deployment details.
Data handling and security controls for the hosted service. Authentication, encryption, integrations, and backup configuration can differ on a self-hosted instance.
Deployment and security assessment: 26 August 2026. Documentation reorganized: 7 September 2026.
Data exchanged with your proxy and AI providers.
| Connection | Data and credentials |
|---|---|
| Proxy sync | Reads logs, activity, and the key list using your LiteLLM credential. Logs contain prompts, responses, model, tokens, latency, and cost. Sync requires a credential that can read across proxy keys; its permissions are broader than one customer’s key. Sync itself uses read endpoints. A leaked credential can expose the proxy’s logs and key list. |
| Customer analysis | Sends the customer’s messages and workspace product notes to the configured provider. Automated retries and follow-up traffic are filtered before the analysis request. The configured personal or workspace provider key is used. Routing analysis through LiteLLM sends inference requests to your proxy using its token, and those requests appear in the proxy’s logs. |
| Aggregate analysis | Sends summarized findings across analyzed customers to produce the aggregate report. |
| Assistant | Retrieves workspace conversations, analysis results, product context, and spend figures to answer questions. Retrieved content is sent to the assistant’s configured provider. Spend totals contain daily usage per key and model and can cover a longer period than conversation logs. |
| Connected AI clients | The hosted service enables the remote API. Any approved member can connect an AI client and retrieve workspace conversation and spend data using their own authorization. Their client’s provider handles that retrieved content. There is no workspace-level switch to disable this path, and these reads are outside the request and AI-call audit logs. |
Provider usage is billed to the configured provider account. LiteLedger’s own AI-call audit trail is not used as analysis input.
Membership, permissions, and server access.
| Role | Scope |
|---|---|
| Workspace member | Read all synced conversations and reports in the workspace and run analyses. Data access is workspace-wide; there are no per-customer permissions. |
| Workspace admin | Member permissions plus shared provider credentials, proxy settings, retention, audit-log viewing and export, and same-domain account approval. |
| Platform admin | Workspace-admin permissions plus deployment settings and platform administration. The three roles are fixed; custom roles are not supported. |
| Server operator | Administrative access to the host permits reading stored conversation data. Workspace permissions apply to application access and do not isolate data from server administrators. |
Workspaces are associated with email domains. Application data access is resolved through the signed-in account’s workspace. This is an application boundary, not a separate database for each customer.
Protection differs by data type.
| Data | Protection on the hosted service |
|---|---|
| Stored credentials | Encrypted with authenticated symmetric encryption. Altered ciphertext fails authentication. |
| AI-call audit bodies | Prompt, system-prompt, and response fields are encrypted before being written to the audit log. Audit metadata is not covered by this body encryption. |
| Synced conversation logs | Stored without application-layer encryption. Access is restricted by file permissions and the process sandbox. |
| Assistant threads and analysis cache | Working copies of conversation and analysis text are stored without application-layer encryption. |
| Backup archives | The archives are not encrypted. File permissions and object-storage access controls restrict access. Credential and audit-body fields remain encrypted inside the archive. |
On self-hosted instances, credential and audit-body encryption depends on configuring the encryption key.
Audit coverage and deletion schedules.
| Data | Deletion behavior |
|---|---|
| Synced conversations | Unlimited retention by default. Workspace admins can select a retention window; pruning removes conversation records older than that window. |
| Audit database rows | A daily sweep deletes audit and request-log rows and revoked-session records older than 90 days. This schedule does not apply to synced conversations. |
| Audit fallback files | If database writes fail, audit rows are written to a file with the same encrypted body fields. These files are outside the automatic sweep and remain until an operator clears them. |
| Backup copies | The hosted schedule keeps 14 daily, 8 weekly, and 6 monthly archives. Records deleted from live storage can remain in existing archives for about six months. Backup retention is configurable for self-hosted instances. |
Browser and process protections.
Hosted location and assurance status.
| Provider | Role |
|---|---|
| DreamHost | Hosts the application server, backup object storage, and outbound mail. The application server and backup storage are in the United States. |
| Provides hosted sign-in, tag management, analytics, and fonts. |
Nightly backups and host recovery.
Control scope in a compromise.
| Scenario | Controls and limits |
|---|---|
| Captured session cookie | Signing out revokes that session’s server-checked identifier. Cookies use HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, and Secure in production. Expiry is seven days without use, so continued use can extend a session. Admins cannot directly revoke another account’s session; denying account access prevents further authorized requests. |
| Leaked backup or disk | Credentials and audit-body fields require the encryption key. Conversation logs and working copies have no application-layer encryption, and backup archives are unencrypted. Storage access controls do not encrypt data once it has been copied. |
| Cross-workspace access | Application access is scoped to the authenticated workspace. This boundary has not undergone external penetration testing. |
| Compromised application process | The process sandbox restricts operating-system access. Data and keys available to the running application remain within the scope of a process compromise. |
| Dependency or tag-manager compromise | Compromised runtime dependencies or the allowed Google Tag Manager container can affect the dashboard. |
| Prompt injection in conversations | Customer conversation text is model input and can contain instructions that influence analysis. The image policy permits external HTTPS images, so a crafted image URL in generated output can make a request to an attacker-controlled host. |
Review the connection requirements.
Setup describes the proxy access needed to connect your workspace.